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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature 0f Case. Appellants (“Petitioners”) challenge the constitutional authority of
Appellee, the City 0f Boise (“City”), t0 provide revenue allocation ﬁnancing, aka tax increment

ﬁnancing (“TIF”), under the Local Economic Development Act (Idaho Code §50-2901,
t0 the City’s

et seq.)

urban renewal agency, the Capitol City Development Agency (“CCDC”), for

funding two urban renewal plans of

CCDC

for a period 0f twenty (20) years in excess

of the

City’s annual revenue without ﬁrst obtaining the approval 0f two-thirds (2/3) of the qualiﬁed
electors for such

ﬁnancing as required by Section 3 0f Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution.

B. Course 0f Proceedings Below. Petitioners ﬁled their

initial

Court for declaratory and injunctive relief 0n January 17, 2019.

Complaint in the District

R. V01

p.

I,

000007.

The

Complaint challenged the constitutionality 0f two ordinances 0f the City passed 0n November
28, 2018, pursuant to Idaho

Code §50-2906:

Ordinance N0. 55-18, which approved and

provided TIF for the Shoreline District Urban renewal Plan (“Shoreline Plan”), and Ordinance

N0. 58-18, which approved and provided TIF for the Gateway East

(“Gateway Plan”). Both Plans became
newspaper on December 20, 2018.
pleading, Petitioners ﬁled an

p.

000014.

effective

On March

upon

11, 2019, prior to the ﬁling

Amended Complaint

Amended Complaint

(R.

Urban renewal Plan

their publication in the

for declaratory

The Amended Complaint made two changes

paragraph 34 of the

District

V01

I,

p.

Idaho Statesman

of any responsive

and injunctive

relief.

R. V01

to the initial Complaint:

(a)

I,

in

000021), greater detail was added to

explicate the dates and monetary information relevant t0 the Petitioners’ opposition t0 the City’s

use tax increment ﬁnancing for the subject

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, PAGE

1

CCDC

Plans;

and

(b) additional Plaintiffs

were

added,

Who had

ﬁled a Second

requested to join, but

Amended Complaint

additional parties Plaintiff, again

who made n0 new

for declaratory

On March

claims.

and injunctive

relief,

29, 2019, Plaintiffs

Which purported

composed of people Who had requested

t0 join but

t0 join

Who made

no new claims.

On April

12,

supported by a legal memorandum. R. V01

(6),

IRCP Rule

2019, the City ﬁled a Motion to Dismiss pursuant t0

a Response t0 the City’s Motion t0 Dismiss.1

p.

I,

On May

000023.

R. V01

R. V01

ﬁled a Reply to Petitioners Response.

I,

p.

p.

I,

On May

000042.

held before the District Court 0n City’s Motion t0 Dismiss.

2019, the District Court entered

Decision and Order,

its

Tr.

(a)

2019, Petitioners ﬁled

10,

On May

000031.

V01

pp. 5-14.

striking the

Complaint, (b) dismissing the individual Plaintiffs that were added in the

and

(c)

dismissing Petitioners’ claims in the Second

20, 2019, the City

22, 2019, a hearing

I,

&

12(b)(1)

Amended Complaint

On

was

July 12,

Second Amended

Amended

Complaint,

that the City violated

Section 3 0f Article VIII 0f the Idaho Constitution by passing ordinances committing the City to

provide TIF t0 the

CCDC

for the

two subject urban renewal Plans,

Urban Renewal Agency 0f City ofRexburg
I,

p.

Motion

to

July 26, 2019, pursuant to

Amend

IRCP Rules

Vol

59(6) and 61(b)(1), Petitioners ﬁled their

and Alter Judgment (Dismissal R. V01

Motion seeking the

District Court’s reconsideration

and Judgment 0f Dismissal (R. V01

1

Hart, 148 Idaho 299, 222 P.3d 467 (2009). R.

000045. Also 0n July 12, 2019, the District Court entered a Final Judgment of Dismissal.2

On

the

v.

citing this Court’s holding in

I,

p.

000064).

0f

On

I,

p.

its

000061) and Brief in Support of

July 12, 2019 Decision and Order

September

11,

2019, the City ﬁled

its

Response Memorandum was inadvertently captioned “Defendant’s Response to Motion to Dismiss.”
move pursuant to IAR Rule 30 to augment the settled clerk's record t0 include the inadvertently
omitted Final Judgment 0f Dismissal entered 0n July 12, 2019.

2

Petitioners’

Petitioners Will
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Amend and

response t0 Plaintiffs’ Motion t0

September

11,

Amend and

Alter Judgment.3

R. V01

Alter Judgment.

On October

Denying Motion

to

I,

p.

000090.

As

18,

On

p.

On

000086.

Amend

R. V01

I,

and Alter Judgment.

Memorandum

its

p.

18, 2019, the District

Tr.

Order and Judgment 0f Dismissal entered 0n July

0n appeal

R. V01

I,

V01

I,

000097.

26, 2019, Petitioners ﬁled their Notice 0f

Second Amended Complaint.

Court

Decision and Order

Appeal herein.

R. V01

stated in the Notice 0f Appeal, Petitioners are not appealing that portion

District Court’s

issues

September

2019, the District Court entered

Amend and Alter Judgment.

On November
000113.

I,

2019, Petitioners ﬁled their Reply t0 the City’s Response t0 Petitioners Motion t0

heard argument 0f the Parties 0n Petitioners’ Motion t0
pp. 15-43.

R. V01

pp. 000113-000114.

12,

I,

p.

0f the

2019, striking Petitioners’

Further, in order t0 narrow the

to the constitutional issues involved, Petitioners

d0 hereby not appeal

that

portion 0f the District Court’s Order and Judgment 0f Dismissal entered 0n July 12, 2019, that

Amended

dismisses the additional Plaintiffs that were added in the

foregoing exclusions, this appeal

is

based 0n Petitioners’

Complaint.

Other than the

Amended Complaint brought by

the

ﬁrst seven listed Plaintiffs.

C.

Summary Statement

Complaint are residents in and
valorem taxes
Petitioner

to.

R. V01

I,

0f Facts.

own

Petitioners are all at all times material t0 this

real property in

pp. 000015-000016.

Mike Gleason was and

is

Ada
At

County, Idaho, for Which they pay ad
all

times material to this Complaint,

a resident 0f the City 0f Eagle,

Ada

County; and

other Petitioners are residents 0f the City of Boise and are registered voters

of, the

3

The

City 0f Boise. R. V01

City’s

I,

3

of the

and are electors

pp. 000015-000016.

Response was inadvertently captioned “Reply” instead 0f “Response”

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, PAGE

in,

all

to Plaintiffs’ Motion.

As

alleged in the

Amended

Complaint, the Ordinances passed by the City approving and

providing tax increment ﬁnancing (“TIF”) for the urban renewal Plans of the

above

(a) obligated the

City t0 ﬁnance the

CCDC’S

CCDC

as described

sum 0f

estimated “Project Costs” in the

$66,500,000.00 for the 20 year duration of the Shoreline Plan, and (b) obligated the City t0

ﬁnance the CCDC’S estimated “Project Costs”
duration of the

Gateway

Plan. R.

V01

I,

in the

The TIF

000019.

p.

sum of $96,500,000.00

for the

20 year

for each of said Plans substantially

exceeded the City’s annual income and revenue. As a matter 0f fact, none 0f the exceptions are
present in this case t0 the requirement in Article VIII Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution

mandating

that the assent

of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualiﬁed electors be obtained for obligations

0f the City exceeding the City’s annual income and revenue, such as a ﬁnding that the revenue
allocation funding

would be used

t0

fund “ordinary and necessary” expenses 0f the City.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did

ON APPEAL

the City create a continuing obligation to the

CCDC

in Violation

of Article

VIII Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution by promulgating the subject Ordinances

pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 50-2906 and thereby adopting the subject Plans 0f the

CCDC

and providing revenue allocation ﬁnancing, aka TIF

said Plans for a period 0f

20 years

in excess

t0 the

CCDC

t0

fund

0f the City’s annual revenue Without

the approval of two-thirds (2/3) 0f the qualiﬁed electors?

2.

Whether by committing

itself to the

CCDC pursuant to said Ordinances to so fund

said Plans, did the City incur a “liability” in Violation 0f Article VIII Section 3 0f

the Idaho Constitution under Feil

643, 129 P. 643 (1912)?
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v.

City 0f Coeur d’ Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P.

Whether the

3.

Koch

et al.

District Court erred in dismissing this case for lack
v,

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

158, 177 P.

that the City did not Violate Article VIII Section 3

0f standing under

3d 372 (2008) by holding

of the Idaho Constitution by

promulgating said Ordinances providing revenue allocation ﬁnancing to the

CCDC

for said Plans in excess 0f the City’s annual revenue without the approval

of two-thirds (2/3) of the qualiﬁed electors?

Petitioners request an

4.

award 0f attorney fees

for attorney fees (a) pursuant t0

Idaho Code § 12-117 0n grounds that Petitioners have vindicated an important
public policy in an action against a city, and (b) under Idaho

Code

§ 12-121 for

an

award 0f fees under the Private Attorney General Doctrine.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Standard 0r Review applicable
which the Court exercises

to constitutional issues are questions

free review." City

389 (2006); Hart, 299 Idaho 300, 222

P.

ofBoise

v.

Frazier, 143 Idaho

1, 2,

0f law over

137 P.3d 388,

3d 223.

IV.

ARGUMENT
In addressing both 0f the District Court’s decisions below, Petitioners will ﬁrst address

the

Memorandum

Decision”), since

Court’s

Motion

0f Decision and Order entered by the District Court on July 12, 2019, (“First
it is

the basis 0f the

Memorandum
t0

Amend

Judgment 0f dismissal. R. V01

I,

p.

000045.

The

District

Decision and Order entered 0n October 18, 2019, denying Petitioners’

and Alter Judgment (“Second Decision”) will be addressed both as part 0f the

discussion 0f the First Decision and then on
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its

own merits.

R. V01

I,

p.

000097.

under Section 3 0f Article VIII

Petitioners have standing for their constitutional claims

0n jurisdictional grounds based 0n the City’s existing obligation
revenues t0 CCDC for the Plans and 0n the related contingent

t0 provide

TIF

arising

liability

therefrom.

The

sole ground asserted

by

the City in

Dismiss ﬁled 0n April 12, 2019 (“City Dismiss

its

Memorandum

Memo”) was

in Support

of

its

Motion

t0

that Petitioners lacked standing

under the traditional rule that in citizens and taxpayers d0 not have standing to challenge
governmental enactment Where the injury
jurisdiction.

R. V01

one suffered alike by

pp. 000027-000029.

I,

City OfLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d

635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989).
(“Pet. Dismiss

is

Id.

Response”)

The City

cited as

that the Idaho

and taxpayer s0 the

primary authority Thomson

its

488 (2002) and Miles

Petitioners countered in their

all citizens

v.

v.

Idaho Power C0., 116 Idaho

Response ﬁled on

May

10,

Supreme Court had carved out a new exception

2019
to the

standard requirements for standing for taxpayers of a jurisdiction seeking relief on constitutional

grounds in Koch

which

is

er al.

v,

subsequent to

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

all

authority cited

by

158, 162-163, 177 P.

the City.

R. V01

the Court explained that the exception t0 the general rule

is

I,

3d 372 (2008), a case

pp. 000034-000040.

“jurisdictional”

In Koch,

and has long been

recognized With regard t0 Article VIII Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution, as follows:

For over one-hundred years this Court has entertained taxpayer or citizen
challenges based upon that constitutional provision (numerous cases cited). Even
though standing is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time, including on
appeal, Beach Lateral Water Users Ass’n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 130 P.3d
1138 (2006),

this

Court has never questioned the standing of a taxpayer to

challenge expenditures that allegedly Violate Article VIII, §

Koch, 145 Idaho

at 162,
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177 P.3d

at 376.

3.

The Court’s opinion

in

Koch

leaves no doubt that this constitutional standing exception

prohibiting a municipality from incurring excessive debt 0r liability Without the requisite voter

approval applies in the present case t0 the City’s allocating the incremental tax revenues t0 the

CCDC.

In this respect the Court stated:

between making an appropriation that is speciﬁcally
prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an indebtedness 0r liability that is
There

is

no

logical difference

speciﬁcally prohibited

Id.

In

145 Idaho

its

at

Constitution.

162-163, 177 P.3d 376-377.

Reply ﬁled on

Koch exception does

by the

May

20,

2019 (“City Dismiss Reply”), the City alleged

that the

not apply in the present case for the following two reasons: “Here the

Amended Complaint does

not allege, and there are n0 facts that would support an allegation, that

the City of Boise incurred

any indebtedness 0r

liability

by promulgating Ordinance N0. 58-18

(“Gateway Plan”) 0r Ordinance No. 55-18 (“Shoreline Plan”).” R. V01

The City was wrong 0n both
paragraphs 27 and 28 (R. V01

CCDC for the two Plans,

I,

counts.

p.

First,

the

I,

Amended Complaint

000019) that the City obligated

pp. 000043-000044.

expressly alleges in

itself to

provide TIF to the

as follows:

In promulgating 0rd. 55-18, the City committed t0 providing TIF
ﬁnancing t0 the CCDC’S estimated “Project Costs” in the sum 0f $66,500,000.00
for the 20 year duration of the Shoreline Plan, commencing retroactively from
Said ﬁnancing substantially
January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2038.
City’s
annual income and revenue.
exceeded the
27.

28.

In promulgating

City committed to providing TIF
estimated “Project Costs” in the sum 0f $96,500,000.00

Ord.

58-18,

the

ﬁnancing t0 the CCDC’S
for the 20 year duration 0f the Gateway Plan, commencing retroactively from
January 1, 2018, through December 31, 2038. Said ﬁnancing substantially
exceeded the City’s annual income and revenue.
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Secondly, paragraph 36 0f the
that the City’s promulgation

Amended Complaint makes

the constitutional allegation

0f the Ordinances “violates the provisions Article VIII Section 3 0f

the Idaho Constitution prohibiting a city or any sub-division 0f the state municipality
incurring, outside 0f ordinary

income and revenue

and necessary expenses, an indebtedness or

Amended Complaint

(R.

V01

I,

incurred an indebtedness 0r liability as a result 0f the City’s

CCDC

to

I,

pp. 000020-000021)

paragraphs 27 and 28 With paragraph 36 by alleging facts supporting

provide tax increment ﬁnancing to the

exceeding

0f qualiﬁed electors.” R. Vol

for a speciﬁc year without the assent

000021. Finally, paragraph 33 0f the

liability

from

its

commitment

p.

ties

claim that the City

in said Ordinances t0

ﬁnance the subject Plans, without the

requisite

voter approval, and in so doing assumed an unconstitutional liability forbidden under Section 3

0f Article VIII 0f the Idaho Constitution, in pertinent part as follows:

“N0

county, city, board 0f education, or school

district, or other subdivision of the state,
any indebtedness, or liability, in any manner, 0r for any purpose, exceeding in
that year, the income and revenue provided for it for such year, Without the assent 0f two
thirds (2/3)
the qualiﬁed electors thereof voting at an election t0 be held for that
(Elf
purpose .....”

shall incur

The

fact that other jurisdictions

have upheld tax increment 0r “revenue allocation”

ﬁnancing of urban renewal plans has been ruled inapplicable by the Idaho Appellate Courts.

4

In City ofBoz'se v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 4, 137 P.3d 388, 391 (2006), this Court summarized the circumstances
surrounding adoption of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, as follows: “Article VIII, § 3 has been part
0f Idaho’s Constitution since the beginning 0f statehood. The draft version 0f Article VIII, § 3 that was submitted to

the 1889Idah0 Constitutional Convention

Constitution of 1879. See

IDAHO

1

was modeled

after

and nearly identical

to Article XI, § 18

of the California

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THECONSTITUTIONALCONVENTION OF
lPROCEEDINGS); CAL. CONST. 0f 1879, Art. XI, § 18. The intention was
from incurring debts Without approval from the voters and a clear plan t0 retire

1889, 589 (1912) (henceforth

t0 prevent local

those debts.

government

entities

DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE IDAHO STATE CONSTITUTION

170

(1994).Br0adly speaking, Article VIII, §3 imposes two requirements to be met by local governments before
incurring indebtedness. The ﬁrst requirement is a public election securing two -thirds of the vote, and the second is
the collection 0f an annual tax sufﬁcient t0

pay the debt Within

thirty years.

The remainder 0f the

section consists 0f

exceptions t0 those requirements, beginning With the previously mentioned proviso clause and continuing With

language added in a series of subsequent amendments not applicable to our analysis.
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Accordingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has limited

The Idaho Supreme Court has

provision t0 considering and applying only Idaho cases.
frequently been requested t0 revise

its

construction 0f Article VIII, Section 3

strict

governments Which advocated adoption 0f other
contrary, the Idaho Appellate Courts have

analysis 0f this constitutional

its

states' interpretations

made

it

by

0f that Section.

local

T0

the

clear that Idaho strictly construes this

provision and does not follow other jurisdictions' interpretations. Greater Boise Auditorium

(“GBAD”)

District

Frazier, 143 Idaho

v.

284

P.

137 P.3d 388, 389 (2006); Miller
City 0f

v.

v.

Coeur d’Alene, 23 Idaho

City ofBuhl, 48 Idaho 668,
32, 129 P. 643 (1912).

“outcome oriented” philosophy of other jurisdictions and has

historical construction

Ltd. v.Cz'ty ofBoise,

court's

v.

1, 2,

843, 845 (1930); Feil
resisted the

Frazier, 159 Idaho 266, 360 P.3d 275 (2015); Koch, supra; Boise

0f

this constitutional provision.

26 Idaho 347, 143

As

the Court in Boise

535 (1914) stated

P. 531,

strictly

in

Idaho has

adhered to the

Development

C0.,

commenting on a California

outcome oriented philosophy:

[W]hen

the court attempts

by argument

to escape the force

and show

constitutional provision under consideration
liability

under the contract,

we

submit that

its

reasoning

and

effect

0f the

that the city incurred

is

no

not sound.

Boise Development C0., Ltd. V.Cily ofBoise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531, 535 (1914).

Petitioners claim that the City’s

commitment

revenue on a long term basis to provide the

CCDC’S

CCDC

said urban renewal Plans including

constitutes an unconstitutional obligation

by

to the

CCDC

t0 allocate

some 0f

CCDC’S

related non- recourse revenue

the City t0 the

32, 129 P. 643 (1912),
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tax

With a long-term revenue stream to fund

CCDC.

Further,

bonds

any such obligation

has a liability component under Section 3 of Article VIII, as the Court explained in Feil

Coeur d’Alene, 23 Idaho

its

v.

City 0f

whereby the Idaho Constitution “not only

prohibits incurring

for

any indebtedness, but

it

any pugpose, exceeding the yearly income and revenue.”

has been interpreted by the Idaho Courts to be

term “indebtedness.” Feil,
Court in Feil so as
“.
.

.the state

The scope 0f

Id.

t0 leave little

any

also prohibits incurring

liability in

any manner or

Moreover, the term

Id.

“liability”

much more sweeping and comprehensive
was

the term “liability

“wiggle room” once an “obligation”

than the

further explained

is

by

the

established as including

of being bound or obligated in law or justice t0 do, pay, or make good something;

legal responsibility...”

Feil,

23 Idaho

at 50,

supra 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531; Straughan

v.

129
City

P. at 649; see also:

Boise Development C0.,

0fCoeur d’Alene, 53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321

(1932).

The Feil Court undertook
under Article VIII, Section

t0 explain the extent

and severity the constitutional limitations

3, as follows:

The framers 0f our Constitution were not content t0 say that “n0 city shall incur
any indebtedness in any manner 0r for any purpose,” but they rather preferred t0
say that “n0 city shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any
purpose.” It must be clear t0 the ordinary mind, 0n reading this language that the
framers 0f the Constitution meant to cover

all kinds and character of debts and
Which a city may become bound, and to preclude circuitous and
evasive methods of incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its

obligations for

inhabitants.

Id.

(Emphasis supplied)

23 Idaho 32, 49-50, 129 P. 643, 648-49

Inherent in the concept of liability
insurer being an example.

failure t0

is

the element of contingency, the liability of an

Assumption 0f an obligation logically

perform that obligation. However, a “potential”

will not sufﬁce.

liability

While reafﬁrming the description 0f the term

nature of allegations of liability
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was

recently analyzed

carries

with

unconnected

it

the liability for

to

any obligation

“liability” in Feil, the

by the Court

in

GBAD v Frazier:

speciﬁc

The framers, while being quite concerned with incurring contingent liabilities,
were not worried about all potential liabilities. The distinction is an important one.
While barring municipalities from incurring contingent liabilities Without a vote
serves the purpose 0f ensuring elected ofﬁcials not bind future ofﬁcials and

taxpayers to irresponsible ﬁnancial deals without citizen approval, barring the
incurring 0f

all

would

potential liabilities

subdivisions, preventing

essentially handcuff governmental

them from entering any deal without a super—majority

vote.

159 Idaho 274; [360 P.3d 283]

In the present case, the City has

CCDC

of the

for

its

failure to perform,

modiﬁed them
its

bond

it is

not only “potential,” but
if

TIF revenue

obligations, clearly the City

CCDC, which

would not

arise

liability

TIF

t0 provide

may be

t0

fund the bonds

contingent on default 0r

an extant contingency based 0n an extant

is

a subsequent City council rescinded the subject Ordinances 0r

to stop or lessen the

obligation t0 the

liability

urban renewal Plans. Hence, the

For example,

obligation.

by ordinance committed

would be

ﬂow

revenue

ﬂow

so as t0 render the

liable t0 the

the

CCDC

CCDC
had

CCDC

for the breach 0f

relied

on

its

assumed

to its detriment.

under the non-recourse bonds issued by the

existing, contingent liability arises as a direct result

unable t0 meet

CCDC.

Such

Instead, this

of the commitment made by the City to the

CCDC under and pursuant t0 the subject Ordinances containing the TIF provisions payable to the
CCDC

for

its

subject urban renewal plans.

CCDC

incremental tax revenues to the

liability

was

rejected

372 (2008). In

by the Court

this respect

difference between

it is

in

at pp.

Koch

somehow

v.

making an appropriation

162-163.

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF, PAGE

11

claim that the City’s Ordinance allocating the
different than the incurring of a debt or

Canyon County, 145 Idaho

worth re-emphasizing that the court

and incurring an indebtedness 0r

Koch

is

Any

158, 162-163, 177 P.

stated:

that is speciﬁcally prohibited

liability that is

speciﬁcally prohibited

“There

by
by

is

n0

3d

logical

the Constitution

the Constitution.

The City

correctly asserts

0n pages 2-3 0f its City Dismiss Reply

renewal agency that uses the revenue allocation ﬁnancing[, and
not alter egos 0f cities.” R. V01

I,

pp. 000043-000044.

But

that]

that “.

.

.it is

the urban

urban renewal agencies are

that does not address the issue

of the

City’s obligation and the consequential liability that arises directly between the City and the

CCDC

as a result 0f the City’s providing

TIF

t0 the

CCDC

pursuant t0 the subject Ordinances.

Likewise, the City’s correct assertion that “...the Act’s grant 0f authority t0 urban renewal
agencies t0 issue revenue allocation bonds does not Violate Article VIII, §§ 3 0r 4 0f the Idaho
Constitution”

is

however equally

Urban Renewal Agency 0f City OfRexburg
has n0 application here, as

is

R. V01

inapposite.

v.

I,

p.

000044.

Finally, the City’s citing

of

Hart, 222 P.3d 467, 148 Idaho 299 (Idaho 2009)

further discussed below.

Id.

Unlike municipalities, urban renewal

agencies are not subdivisions 0f the state Within the meaning 0f Sections 3 0r 4 0f Article VIII 0f
the Idaho Constitution. Hart, 148 Idaho 301,

Kong Corp, 94 Idaho

B.

In

its

0f the

v.

Yick

876, 882, 499 P.2d 575, 581 (1972).

First Decision, the District

CCDC,

222 P.3d 469; Boise Redevelopment Agency

Which

is

Court erred by conﬂating the City’s

liability

With that

not Subject t0 the restrictions 0f Article VIII Section 3 0f the

Idaho Constitution.

As pointed

out above, the City misread the decision in the Hart case as

somehow being

authority for dispelling the City’s obligation and consequential liability arising

commitment

to the

CCDC. The

District

Court agreed With the City and in

its

from
First

Here, the Plaintiffs speciﬁcally allege in the Amended Complaint that the
“revenue allocation funding” in the Shoreline and Gateway Urban Renewal Plans
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TIF

Decision

concluded and held as follows:

violates Article VIII §3 0f the Idaho Constitution.

its

Because the Idaho Supreme

Court has directly addressed

Urban Renewal Agency 0f Rexburg

this issue in

v.

Hart, and because the Idaho Supreme Court has held that revenue allocation

bonds d0 not violated section 3 0f Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution, the
Court ﬁnds the City did not incur indebtedness or liability. Therefore, the Court
GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims in the
Amended Complaint that Boise City’s commitment t0 allocate “revenue
allocation funding,”

CCDC

also

knowns

as “tax increment financing” (“TIF”) to the

No. 55-18 for the Shoreline District and
Urban Renewal Plan and / or Ordinance N0. 58-18 for the Gateway East District
and Urban Renewal Plan Violate Article VIII,§ 3 of the Idaho Constitution.
R. V01

for twenty years in Ordinance

I,

As argued
(“Pet Brief t0

September

18,

000056.

p.

in Petitioners’ Brief in Support

Amend”)

(R.

decision in Hart, but that

CCDC

I,

it

its

First

Amend

and Alter Judgment

000067-000073), and by Petitioners’ counsel

p.

2019 hearing 0n said Motion

respectfully contend that in

0f the

V01

of their Motion t0

(Tr.

V01

I,

p. 15, L.

23

-

at the

p. 19, L. 25), the Petitioners

Decision the District Court not only misconstrued the

has erroneously conﬂated the constitutionally unrestricted authority

t0 obligate itself by issuing

revenue bonds funded by TIF revenue under the Local

Economic Development Act, Idaho Code

§

50-2901,

et seq.,

With the constitutionally restricted

authority 0f the City under Section 3 of Article VIII, to incur an obligation or liability in an

amount

greater than one year’s revenue.

Supreme Court’s holding

commitment

to the

in

Further, Petitioners contend that not only does the

Hart not apply

t0 the issue

0f the City’s alleged

liability for its

urban renewal agency to provide TIF funding, but that the Court in Hart

expressly abstained from addressing that issue.

In Hart, the issue of the alleged unconstitutional liability of the City of Rexburg, based

on

its

commitment

two primary
However,

to provide

issues that

were

TIF funding
briefed,

t0 the

urban renewal agency, was raised as one 0f the

and argued

(the other issue being the “alter

ego issue”).

Plaintiff Hart, initially appearing pro se, failed to timely ﬁle his challenge t0 the Local
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Economic Development Act within

the required 30 days required under Idaho

Code

50-

§

2927(2), With the result that the Court declined t0 address this issue.

See, Hart, 148 Idaho 301,

“Many 0f Hart's arguments

are challenges t0 the City's

222 P.3d 469. See

also, Hart, Footnote

enactment 0f Ordinance N0. 950.
ordinance.”

The point here

is

We

1:

are not free t0 reach the merits 0f his challenges t0 the

that the issue

0f the City’s Violation 0f the restrictions 0f Section 3

of Article VIII by passing ordinances providing TIF to the urban renewal agency to ﬁnance
plans,

which

is

the issue in the present case,

was

intentionally

and expressly not addressed

its

in

Hart.

Accordingly, the Court in Hart addressed only the “alter ego” issue in the context 0f the
authority of the urban renewal agency, not the municipality, t0 approve and issue revenue bonds.

Thus,

we

0f the

consider only Whether the district court erred in conﬁrming the validity

Agency's

authorizing

the

resolution

issuance

approving

of revenue

the

bond purchase agreement and
bonds, the bond purchase

allocation

agreement, and the bonds that the Agency proposes t0
Id, at

sell t0

Zions.

148 Idaho 301, 222 P.3d 469.

In pursuing the “alter ego” issue in that case, the Plaintiff in

Hart argued

that the

urban

renewal agency's use of revenue allocation ﬁnancing was really an action undertaken by the

because the agency was merely an

"alter

appointed themselves to serve on the

city,

ego" 0f the city arising from the fact that the former

latter.

Thus, the Plaintiff in Hart argued, as an

alter

ego of

the city, the urban renewal agencies’ use 0f revenue allocation ﬁnancing violates Article VIII,

Sections 3 and 4 0f the Idaho Constitution.

that the

same people can wear
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different hats

The Court

disagreed, essentially

0n the proposition

and serve

in multiple positions.

Signiﬁcantly, the

Law

Court found that “(E)Ven as amended, the
duties 0f the urban renewal

does not allow a city t0 usurp the powers and

agency (Hart, 148 Idaho 301, 222 P.3d 469). The Court concluded:

Urban renewal agencies

are not the

"

alter

egos" 0f cities under the Law, and thus

an agency's issuance 0f revenue allocation bonds does not Violate Article VIII, §§
3 0r 4 0f the Idaho Constitution.
148 Idaho 303; 222 P.3d 471

Hence, as independent public bodies corporate and

politic pursuant to

Idaho Code §50-

2006(a), urban renewal agencies are distinct legal entities With independent authority and are not
subdivisions 0f the state within the meaning 0f Sections 3 0r 4 0f Article VIII of the Idaho
Constitution. Boise

581

(1972).

Redevelopment Agency

Moreover,

the

v.

Yick Kong, 94 Idaho 876, 881-882, 499 P.2d 575,

proposed revenue

allocation

bonds d0 not

constitutional terms 0f “indebtedness” 0r “liability,” because 0f the

Section

1,

fall

amendment

within

the

t0 Article VIII,

providing that urban renewal agencies are exempt from the operation of the vote

requirements 0f Article VIII, Section

3.

Thus, What urban renewal agencies can d0 pursuant t0

Idaho Code §50-2006, such as issue revenue bonds,

is

irrelevant

and inapplicable

t0

What a

subdivision of the State, such as the City 0f Boise, can do under the constraints of Article VIII,

Section

3.

The

District

Court mixed apples and oranges in erroneously concluding that “the City

did not incur indebtedness 0r liability,” because “revenue allocation bonds d0 not Violate Section

3

C.

of Article VIII of the Idaho Constitution.”

R. V01

I,

p 000056.

its Second Decision, the District Court erred by holding that the City made no
commitment, incurred n0 indebtedness 0r liability under Section 3 Article VIII, because
the allocated TIF revenues are paid by the County directly t0 the CCDC.

In

In

its

Second Decision, the

District

Court reiterated

its

claim that the holding in Hart

regarding the authority granted urban renewal agencies exempted the City from the restrictions
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imposed under Section

3 Article VIII in the City’s provision

apparently on a different rationale. R. V01

I,

p.

000103. In

0f TIF for

CCDC’S

this respect, the District

Plans, but

Court found

and held as follows:

The only

basis 0f action

by

the City alleged

Further, in paragraph 32 of the

required

Amended

by Idaho Code §50-2908,

is

promulgating the ordinance.

Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege, “as

CCDC

the TIF revenues allocated to the

pursuant t0 the ordinances are calculated and paid directly t0 the CCDC by the
County Treasurer 0f Ada County, Idaho.” So, the Plaintiffs acknowledge in the

Amended Complaint

that the TIF revenues are paid directly from the County t0
and are never paid t0 the City and then diverted t0 the CCDC. Therefore,
the Court Will not reconsider its decision as t0 Urban Renewal (Hart) prohibiting
a constitutional challenge 0n the City’s indebtedness 0r commitment 0f funds.

CCDC

In reaching this conclusion based

Complaint (R. V01.

I,

p.

0n the allegation

000020), Which under

IRCP Rule

in paragraph

8(a) is sufﬁcient, the

ignores the fuller treatment 0f the funding process in the Pet. Brief t0

that the

County’s role

is

“ministerial” in nature, and that

32 0f the

it is

Amended

Court completely

Amend, Which

the municipality that

is

explains

responsible

for allocating the tax increment ﬁnancing, as follows:

The municipality’s

role in making and controlling the allocation is further
emphasized by the fact that the municipality is “empowered t0 adopt, at any time,
a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision” and thereafter modify it. Idaho Code §
50-2904. The plain language of the Act provides that it is the municipality that
allocates the tax increment ﬁnancing and is “empowered” t0 d0 so by enacting an
ordinance adopting a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision. Idaho Code §§ 502904 — 2906. And, the City of Boise did so in this case, but Without voter

approval.

R. V01.

1,

p.

Moreover,

000011.

at the

September

18,

2019 hearing 0n

Petitioners’

Motion

to

Amend

and Alter

Judgment, counsel for the Petitioners explained that the act of the County Treasurer in handling

and transferring the allocated TIF revenues was a ministerial
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act required

by

statute,

but

nevertheless involved funds that

would otherwise have gone

t0 the City.

Tr. Vol.

I.

p. 31, L. 1—

16.

In any event, regardless 0f the role 0f the County,
the District Court’s prior decision regarding

Idaho precedent has

made

remains difﬁcult t0 determine

Hart remains relevant

clearly conﬂated the roles of the urban renewal

00012-000013.

it

it

how

here, since that decision

agency and the municipality.

R. Vol.

I,

pp.

clear that the action 0f the municipality in

promulgating an ordinance that allocates funds for payment t0 a third party in speciﬁc amounts
over a speciﬁc period

is

an act 0f assumpsit that creates a

processing 0f the funds so allocated.

3 13,

303 P.2d 672 (1956),

0f the City of Idaho

in

In the case 0f O'Bryam‘

Which the court held a gas

Falls, the

Court held that

ordinance that was the unconstitutional

act,

it

v.

City

ofldaho

fuel cooperative

was

of the ministerial
Falls, 78 Idaho

was merely an

alter

the act of promulgating the funding

this respect, the

Court explained:

plan t0 evade and circumvent the constitutional limitation on the creation of

debt

is

not valid merely because the bonds representing the debt are declared not

be the obligations 0f the municipality. Hardin v. Owensboro Educational Ass'n,
244 Ky. 390, 50 S.W.2d 968; State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority
v. Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200; Reynolds v. City 0f Waterville, 92
Me. 292, 42 A. 553; City and County ofSan Francisco v. Boyle, 195 Cal. 426,
233 P. 965.
to

"Contrary to popular opinion, mere schemes to evade law, once their true
character

is

aside as so

established, are impotent for the purpose intended. Courts

much

rubbish." Davis

v.

People, 79 C010. 642, 247

sweep them
page

P. 801, at

802.

What cannot be done

directly by the City 0f Idaho Falls because 0f constitutional
be accomplished indirectly. That which the constitution directly
not be done by indirection through a plan 0r instrumentality
evade the constitutional prohibition. Atkinson v. Board 0f

limitations cannot

prohibits

may

attempting

t0
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ego

regardless 0f the fact that the bonds that were created

were not the obligation 0f the municipality. In

A

liability irrespective

28 L. R.A.,N.S., 412; Macallen C0.
Commonwealth ofMassachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 49 S.Ct. 432, 73 L.Ed. 874.
Commissioners, 18 Idaho 282, 108

Likewise in Miller

Supreme Court held

P. 1046,

City ofBuhl, 48 Idaho 668,

v.

284

VIII, Section 3, 0f the Constitution.

To

the

same

53 Idaho 494, 24 P.2d 321; General Hospital

v.

72 A.L.R. 682, the Idaho

that the city could not incur obligation for purchase

system t0 be paid for from receipts from sale of power and

(1949); Williams

P. 843,

v.

light

effect, see

of an

electric generating

Without complying with Article

Straughan

v.

City 0f Coeur d'Alene,

City 0f Grangeville, 69 Idaho 6, 201 P.2d 750

City 0f Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475; Boise-Payette

Lumber

Challis Independent School District N0. I, 46 Idaho 403, 268 P. 26 (1928); Boise

C0., Ltd.

v.

v.

C0.

v.

Development

Boise City, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531.

Second Decision, the District Court erred by holding that the words
“commitment” and / 0r “contract” as used by Petitioners in the context 0f the Amended
Complaint are insufﬁcient express, and detract from the alleged “obligation” 0r
“liability” 0f the City in the premises under Article VIII, Section 3 0f the Idaho

In

its

Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the

commitment by

subject Ordinances to provide TIF funding of

liability,

which

is

CCDC

arising

from the

projects constitutes an obligation that creates a

in this case is unconstitutional for lack

application of the Local

case

its

the City to the

Economic Development Act

0f voter approval, thus rendering such

unconstitutional.

The primary

issue in this

Whether the City violated Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution when

it

undertook an obligation by means 0f promulgating a binding ordinance, without the requisite
approval 0f the qualiﬁed electors, t0 provide a long-term revenue stream Via revenue allocation

ﬁnancing (“TIF”)

to

an urban renewal agency in amounts exceeding the municipality’s annual

revenue, pursuant t0 Idaho

Code §§ 50-2904 — 50-2906.
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Petitioners aver that this obligation

logically

to Idaho.

and

and actually creates a resulting

liability,

Which, as discussed above,

0f a sort unique

is

In the present case, Petitioners claim that the City created such an illegal obligation

When

liability

it

promulgated Ordinance Nos. 55-18 and 58-18 under Idaho Code

§

50-2906

approving the Plans that contained a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision without the requisite
voter approval.

The only way an urban renewal plan containing a revenue
can be approved and effectuated

Code

§

50—2906.

is

for the municipality t0 enact

county in which the revenue allocation
municipality’s role in

making and
‘6

is

to

it is

“.
.

.shall

be paid to the agency by the treasurer 0f the

controlling the allocation

modify

it.

Idaho Code

district is located...”

...empowered to adopt,

provision...” and thereafter

provides that

an ordinance pursuant t0 Idaho

After the ordinance has been enacted, the revenues allocated to the urban

renewal agency pursuant t0 the ordinance

the municipality

allocation ﬁnancing provision

is

further

§

50-2908(3).

emphasized by the

The

fact that

any time, a revenue allocation ﬁnancing

at

Idaho Code

§

50-2904.

The plain language 0f

the municipality that allocates the tax increment ﬁnancing and

is

the

Act

“empowered”

d0 so by enacting an ordinance adopting a revenue allocation ﬁnancing provision. Idaho Code

§§ 50-2904

The

— 2906. And the City of Boise

liability arises

under these circumstances once the City commits by ordinance

supply the revenue stream to the

commitment

did so in this case, but without voter approval.

in proceeding

CCDC under the Act.

The

forward under Idaho Code

CCDC
§

in turn relies

7-1301

on

t0

that funding

seeking judicial

et seq.,

conﬁrmation of the validity of the resolution, the bond purchase agreement, and the bonds t0 be
issued thereunder for the respective Plan projects. Thus a promissory liability
forth in a written

document: the ordinance.
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The

CCDC

undoubtedly

relies

is

0n

created as set

this

promised

ﬁnancing not only for

its

Plan projects, but for

its

Where said commitments were breached by the

solvency as well. Under circumstances

City, Petitioners aver the

of action against the City for breach of contract.

entitled t0 bring a cause

such as the “non-recourse” bond holders, cannot sue the City

parties,

a legal

own

entity, and, as such,

its

is

is irrelevant.

The

Who

that third

CCDC

0n the

relies

word “commitment” with

respect to a ﬁnancial

For example in the Investopedia dictionary, “a loan commitment

appropriate.

is

detriment.

In light of the foregoing, use of the

obligation

would be

To argue

can sue for breach 0f contract like any other person

performance 0f a contract t0

CCDC

is

an

agreement by a commercial bank or other ﬁnancial institution t0 lend a business 0r individual a

sum of money.’

speciﬁed

’

A

https://www.investopedia.com.

Webster’s

pledge 0r promise to do something.”

commitment

V01

I,

call

money over

it

was of a

contract or a

contractual nature; that “It

commitment.

23) Yet, in

comments by Counsel,

as follows:

I,

Amended
Vol

I,

p.

It is

‘6

a

Amend and Alter Judgment

its

is

an obligation.

You

can

call

an obligation undertaken by ordinance to provide

a long 20- year period in excess of

p. 34, L. 16 to L.

V01.

as

pp. 15-43), in a colloquy with the District Court, Petitioners’ counsel explained that

the obligation of the City

one can

deﬁned

Dictionary, 3rd College Edition

New World

1987. At the September 18, 2019 hearing on Petitioners’ Motion t0

(Tr.

is

its

annual t0 the urban renewal agency.”

Second Decision, the

“But there

is

District

is

Tr.

Court misinterpreted these

no such contract actually alleged

Complaint. The only basis of action by the City

(

in the

promulgating the Ordinance.”

R.

00103. Nevertheless again and again throughout their Pet. Brief t0 Amend, Petitioners

had stressed

that indeed

it

was

the ordinance promulgated

by

the City that created the subject

obligation and attendant liability. Finally, the District Court appeared to pick out, consider, and
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criticize particular allegations

0f fact and speciﬁc words in the used in the

separately and disassociated With the other paragraphs and ignore the

inferences expressed

respect, Petitioners

by

said paragraphs taken in their entirety.

draw the Court’s

Amended Complaint

combined meaning and

R. V01.

I,

p.

00102.

attention to the function 0f paragraph 23 of the

Complaint, Which paragraph serves t0 combine and integrate as a Whole

In that

Amended

0f the previous,

all

speciﬁc allegations of fact t0 support the legal allegation 0f the City’s constitutional Violation

V.

CONCLUSION
The City violated

Article VIII, Section 3 0f the Idaho Constitution

When

it

promulgated a

binding ordinance, without the requisite approval of the qualiﬁed electors, to provide a long—term

revenue stream Via revenue allocation ﬁnancing (“TIF”) t0 an urban renewal agency in amounts
exceeding the municipality’s annual revenue, pursuant t0 Idaho Code §§ 50-2904 — 50-2906.
This obligation logically and actually created a resulting

of a

sort

Which, as discussed above,

is

unique t0 Idaho. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the decision in Hart

is

inapposite,

and therefore the

District Court’s denial

reafﬁrmed in the Second Decision

is

liability,

0f standing in the First Decision and

erroneous and should be overturned.

Accordingly, the

Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Distract Court should be reversed.

DATED this

17th

day of July, 2020

RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

/S/

John Runft

JOHN L. RUNFT
Attorney for Appellants
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